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Actuality.

Concepto de tercero responsable.

Traffic accident. Concept covering any person required, under national law, to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the victim or those entitled under him.

SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA UE (Sala Quinta) de 15 de octubre de 2015.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber). Resolution 15 October 2015.

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

“On 28 May 2002, Ms Corrazzini, a Commission official, was seriously injured as a pedestrian in a road traffic accident involving Mr Kohaila, who was insured by Axa Belgium. The subsequent police investigation did not establish that Mr Kohaila was at fault. That conclusion was confirmed during civil proceedings before the referring court. On 6 November 2003, the Invalidity Committee established by the Commission declared Ms Corrazzini to be suffering from total permanent invalidity which prevented her from performing her duties, with the result that she was retired on 3 December 2003 and granted an invalidity pension in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 78 of the Staff Regulations, with effect from 1 January 2004. The Commission paid Ms Corrazzini’s medical expenses and continued to pay her remuneration between 28 May 2002 and 1 January 2004, the date from which the Commission paid her an invalidity pension. As long ago as 27 June 2002, the Commission wrote to Axa Belgium to inform it that the Commission was subrogated to the rights of Ms Corrazzini. On 20 September 2004, the Commission requested that Axa Belgium reimburse it the amounts that it had paid to Ms Corrazzini. Since Axa Belgium refused to make that reimbursement on the ground that the Commission had not established the liability of the party insured by Axa Belgium, the Commission brought proceedings against that insurer before the Belgian courts, basing its application, inter alia, on Article 29 bis of the Law of 21 November 1989. The Tribunal de police de Bruxelles (local criminal court, Brussels) delivered a judgment on 6 January 2012 dismissing the Commission’s application. The European Union, represented by the Commission, brought an appeal against that decision before the Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles (French language court of first instance, Brussels), the referring court, seeking an order that Axa Belgium pay the sum of EUR 392 650.14 in respect of the medical expenses incurred by Ms Corrazzini, the continued payment of her remuneration for the period from 25 May 2002 to 31 December 2003 and the invalidity pension in respect of the period from 1 January 2004 to August 2012, as well as a lump sum of EUR 167 970.03 for the payment of invalidity allowances as from 1 September 2012. Before the referring court, Axa Belgium submits that the European Union cannot validly argue that it is subrogated to the rights of Ms Corrazzini since Article 85a of the Staff Regulations provides for a subrogated claim only against the third party responsible for the damage. Axa Belgium argues that it has not been established that the party insured by it is responsible for the accident. The referring court therefore queries the exact scope of the concept of ‘the third party’ (‘le tiers responsable’) as referred to in Article 85a of the Staff Regulations.    Furthermore, the referring court considers that reimbursement of the invalidity pension paid by the European Union to Ms Corrazzini may not, in any event, be required on the basis of a subrogated claim, pursuant to Article 85a(1) of the Staff Regulations, since the European Union, which is subrogated to the rights of the victim, cannot claim greater rights than the victim enjoyed against ‘the third party’ under the applicable national law. As it is, the invalidity pension granted by the European Union to Ms Corrazzini is beyond the scope of Axa Belgium’s obligation under Article 29 bis of the Law of 21 November 1989 to pay Ms Corrazzini compensation since that invalidity pension is, according to national case-law, separate from and independent of the loss suffered by Ms Corrazzini. By contrast, the referring court considers that reimbursement of the invalidity pension paid by the European Union to Ms Corrazzini could, in principle, be required on the basis of a direct action in accordance with Article 85a(4) of the Staff Regulations. In that respect, the referring court considers that there is nothing to prevent the European Union, as the victim’s employer, from being treated as ‘entitled under’ the victim, for the purposes of Article 29 bis of the Law of 21 November 1989. However, the referring court is unsure whether the condition laid down in that Article, to the effect that the European Union must have personally suffered damage, has been met. In that respect, the referring court notes that while, according to the national case-law, any person who is required, on the basis of a contractual, statutory or regulatory obligation, to make a payment may bring an action against the liable third party, that option is ruled out with regard to expenses or benefits which, in accordance with the content or scope of the agreement, law or regulation, must definitively remain the responsibility of the person who is so obliged or who must give effect to it under the law or regulation. In those circumstances, the Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles (French language court of first instance, Brussels) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1)   Must the term ‘the third party’ (‘le tiers responsable’) used in Article 85a(1) of the Staff Regulations of European Officials be interpreted autonomously in EU law, or does it refer to the meaning that the term has in national law? (2) If the term has an autonomous scope, must it be interpreted as covering any person who caused the death, accidental injury or sickness of a person or only a person who is liable by reason of a fault that that person has committed? (3)  If the term ‘the third party’ (‘le tiers responsable’) is to be interpreted in accordance with national law, does EU law require the national court to allow a subrogated claim lodged by the European Union where one of its officials has been the victim of a road traffic accident involving a vehicle in respect of which liability has not been established, inasmuch as Article 29 bis of the Law of 21 November 1989 on compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles provides for the automatic compensation of vulnerable road users by insurers who cover the civil liability of the owner, driver or keeper of the motor vehicle involved in the accident, without the civil liability of the owner, driver or keeper having to be established? (4)  Does the content or the scheme of the Staff Regulations mean that the expenses incurred by the European Union under Articles 73 and 78 of those regulations must definitively remain its own responsibility”.

The first question:

“ By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the concept of ‘the third party’ (‘le tiers responsable’), mentioned in Article 85a of the Staff Regulations, must be interpreted as referring to the national law applicable to the cause of death, the accidental injury or the sickness, within the meaning of that provision, or whether that concept must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation within the EU legal order. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, the purpose of Article 85a of the Staff Regulations is not to alter the national rules applicable for determining whether and to what extent there is liability on the part of the third party who caused the damage. That third party’s liability remains subject to the substantive rules which are normally to be applied by the national court before which the victim’s proceedings are brought, that is to say, in principle, the legislation of the Member State in whose territory the damage occurred (judgment in Clinique La Ramée and Winterthur, C‑397/02, EU:C:2004:502, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the first question is not to be understood as relating to the substantive rules determining whether and to what extent the third party who caused the damage is liable, since those rules are within the scope of the applicable national law. That question refers rather to whether the concept of ‘the third party’ contains an element which restricts the subrogation laid down in Article 85a of the Staff Regulations on the basis of the distinction made under national law between two schemes for compensating the victims of accidents, one relating to liability and the other to automatic compensation, or whether the concept should be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation within the EU legal order. Under Article 85a of the Staff Regulations, the European Union is subrogated only to the rights and rights of action of the victim or those entitled under him against ‘the third party’. Accordingly, the interpretation of that concept determines whether the subrogation provided for in Article 85a of the Staff Regulations has a uniform scope across the whole of the European Union or whether that scope depends on the delimitation of liability according to categories established by national law.”

“It should be noted that the Court has consistently held that it follows from the need for a uniform application of EU law, and the principle of equality, that the terms of a provision of EU law, which make no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope, must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must take into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (judgments in Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C‑201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited, and Modelo Continente Hipermercados, C‑343/13, EU:C:2015:146, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). In that respect, it should be noted that Article 85a(1) of the Staff Regulations makes no such express reference in so far as concerns the concept of ‘the third party’. In order to determine whether that concept should be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation in the EU legal order, it is necessary, having regard to the case-law referred to in paragraph 21 of the present judgment, to take into account the legislative context of Article 85a of the Staff Regulations, since those regulations are intended to regulate the legal relations between the European institutions and their officials, by establishing a series of reciprocal rights and obligations (see, to that effect, judgment in Johannes, C‑430/97, EU:C:1999:293, paragraph 19). In accordance with Article 1a of the Staff Regulations, officials are entitled to equal treatment under those regulations, meaning that the regulations, as a general rule, must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union.  Accordingly, the concept of ‘the third party’, which determines the extent of the subrogation provided for in Article 85a of the Staff Regulations, must be given an interpretation which permits its autonomous and uniform application throughout the European Union. If the subrogation, determined by reference to the interpretation to be given to the concept of ‘the third party’, were to depend on the classification given under different national laws to comparable compensation schemes in terms of whether they are liability related or not, a situation of inequality could arise to the advantage of certain officials. While the European Union would be subrogated to the rights of an official if national law considered the obligation of a third party towards that official to be linked to liability, that subrogation would not apply if the same obligation to compensate a victim was classified by national law as a separate form of compensation. Thus, there would be a risk that officials not affected by subrogation of the European Union could be compensated twice for the same loss, while that would not be the case for officials to whose rights the European Union was subrogated.  Accordingly, if the interpretation of the concept of a ‘third party’ were to follow categories provided for under national law, the European Union could be subrogated to the rights of an official in respect of a situation involving liability under one national law but not under another, which would create discrepancies in the application of the Staff Regulations to the advantage of certain officials, depending on the applicable national law. It follows that the concept of ‘the third party’ (‘le tiers responsable’), referred to in Article 85a(1) of the Staff Regulations, must, for the purposes of determining the scope of the subrogation laid down therein, be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation within the EU legal order.”

 

The second question: “ By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the concept of ‘the third party’, within the meaning of Article 85a(1) of the Staff Regulations, covers only a third party required, by reason of fault on his part that has given rise to damage, to pay compensation for the damage that he has caused to the official concerned, or whether the concept covers any person, including insurers, under an obligation, under national law, to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the victim or those entitled under him. As regards, first, the wording of Article 85a of the Staff Regulations, it should be noted, by way of illustration, that while the German version expressly refers to the concept of fault using the words ‘auf das Verschulden eines Dritten’, the English version uses the more neutral words ‘caused by a third party’. Other language versions such as Spanish (‘imputable a un tercero’), French (‘imputable à un tiers’), Italian (‘imputabile a un terzo’), Dutch (‘aan een derde is te wijten’) and Portuguese (‘imputável a um terceiro’) allude to the concept of accountability without making any mention of that of fault. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment in Léger, C‑528/13, EU:C:2015:288, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). It follows that, having regard to the differences referred to in paragraph 29 of the present judgment between the different language versions of Article 85a of the Staff Regulations, that provision must be interpreted, in particular, in the light of its purpose.  It is clear from the Court’s settled case-law that the purpose of the subrogation of the European Union referred to in Article 85a of the Staff Regulations is to ensure that an official is not compensated twice in respect of the same damage. In so far as the damage suffered by an official renders the European Union subject to the obligation to pay him benefits under the Staff Regulations, the risk of twofold compensation can be avoided only if the official is deprived of his rights against any third party responsible for causing him damage, those rights being transferred to the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments in Royale belge, C‑333/90, EU:C:1992:94, paragraph 9 and the case-law cited, and Lucaccioni v Commission, C‑257/98 P, EU:C:1999:402, paragraph 20).       That aim can be fully achieved only if the subrogation provided for in that article covers schemes for compensating victims of accidents, irrespective of whether those schemes are regarded under the national law concerned as a fault-based liability regime or as another form of obligation to provide compensation, including when those schemes require, as in the case of the rules at issue in the main proceedings, that a third party pay compensation for damage irrespective of any fault. Accordingly, given the purpose of the subrogation provided for in Article 85a of the Staff Regulations, the concept of ‘the third party’ must be interpreted broadly and may not be limited to cases entailing fault-based liability alone. Consequently, the answer to the second question must be that the concept of ‘the third party’, within the meaning of Article 85ª (1) of the Staff Regulations, covers any person, including insurers, required under national law to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the victim or those entitled under him.”

The third question:” In view of the answers to the first and second questions, there is no need to reply to the third question.”

The fourth question: “By its fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the Staff Regulations must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a direct action under Article 85a(4) of those regulations, the benefits that the European Union is obliged to provide under, first, Article 73 of those regulations, covering risks of sickness and accident, and, secondly, Article 78 of the regulations, in respect of the payment of an invalidity pension, must definitively remain its own responsibility. First, it must be noted that, as is clear from the request for a preliminary ruling, since the invalidity pension does not constitute, in accordance with national case-law, damage to the victim of the accident at issue in the main proceedings, it is separate from and independent of the loss suffered by that victim. However, the European Union’s obligation to pay benefits to the victim under Articles 73 and 78 of the Staff Regulations might constitute damage to the European Union in its own right. According to the referring court, pursuant to the national case-law referred to in paragraph 14 of the present judgment, that possibility would be excluded if the benefit in question had, under the applicable rules, definitively to remain the responsibility of the European Union. In that regard, it should be noted that the damage sustained by the European Union in its own right derives from its obligation to pay the victim benefits under Articles 73 and 78 of the Staff Regulations and follows, accordingly, so far as the Union is concerned, from an obligation imposed by the Staff Regulations. As regards the question whether the benefits provided for in Articles 73 and 78 of the Staff Regulations must definitively remain the responsibility of the European Union, it should be noted, first, that Article 85a(4) of the Staff Regulations expressly provides that the European Union is not restricted to claiming by way of subrogation under Article 85a(1) of those regulations for damage suffered by its officials, but may also bring a direct action to obtain compensation for damage sustained in its own right, in particular on account of the benefits that it is required to pay under those regulations.”

“Secondly, while the nature of the invalidity pension at issue in the main proceedings arises out of a particular feature of the relationship under the Staff Regulations between the European Union and its officials, the need to respect that particular feature does not, however, mean that benefits paid as an invalidity pension must definitively remain the responsibility of the European Union. Having regard to all the above considerations, the answer to the fourth question is that the Staff Regulations may not be interpreted as meaning that, within the framework of a direct action under Article 85a(4) of those regulations, the benefits that the European Union is obliged to provide under, first, Article 73 of those regulations, covering risks of sickness and accident, and, secondly, Article 78 of the regulations, in respect of the payment of an invalidity pension, must definitively remain its own responsibility.”

 

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules: “ 1.   The concept of ‘the third party’ (‘le tiers responsable’) referred to in Article 85a(1) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities laid down by Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities and instituting special measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission, as amended by Council Regulation (EC, ECSC, Euratom) No 781/98 of 7 April 1998, must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation within the EU legal order. 2.   The concept of ‘the third party’ (‘le tiers responsable’), referred to in Article 85a(1) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities laid down by Regulation No 259/68, as amended by Regulation No 781/98, covers any person, including insurers, required under national law to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the victim or those entitled under him. 3.   The Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities laid down by Regulation No 259/68, as amended by Regulation No 781/98, may not be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a direct action under Article 85a(4) of those regulations, the benefits that the European Union is required to provide under, first, Article 73 of those regulations, covering risks of sickness and accident, and, secondly, Article 78 of the regulations, in respect of the payment of an invalidity pension, must definitively remain its own responsibility.”

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